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entry in the product market mitigate the impact of labor market deregu-
lation. We, then, use the Italian Social Security employer-employee panel
to study the interaction between barriers to entry and dismissal costs. We
exploit the fact that costs for unjust dismissals in Italy increased for firms
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1 Introduction
Labor market regulations have often been blamed for the poor performance
of European labor markets. However, lack of sharp changes in labor market
regulations has made it difficult to identify the impact of these regulations on
employment. Evidence on the impact of labor market regulations remains
mixed (see, e.g., Nickell and Layard, 1999). Moreover, even when it is possible
to identify the impact of regulations, they appear to have moderate effects (e.g.,
Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz, 2003). For this reason, attention has turned to
other causes for high and persistent unemployment in Europe.
Recently, attention has focused on the impact of restricted competition in
the product market on employment.1 On the one hand, product market regula-
tions may reduce the number of firms and provide firms with market power, thus
reducing employment levels due to scale effects. On the other hand, product
market regulations may introduce barriers to entrepreneurship making it diffi-
cult to set up new firms and create new jobs. Bertrand and Kramarz (2002)
use a unique panel for the French retail trade industry and find that stronger
deterrence of entry by regional zoning boards slowed down employment growth
in those regions. Boeri, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2000), instead, use cross-
sectional indicators of product market regulations generated by the OECD for
27 countries and find a negative correlation between their indicator of barriers
to entrepreneurship and employment-to-population ratios. Also, Djankov et
al. (2002) present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 85
countries and find that countries with heavier regulation of entry have larger
underground economies.
In this paper, we present new evidence on the impact of employment pro-
tection legislation exploiting the differential change in severance pay for unfair
dismissals in Italy in large and small firms after 1990, and then ask whether
the effects of employment protection vary with the strictness of product mar-
ket regulations. Krueger and Pischke (1997) have argued, for example, that
besides labor market rigidities, restrictions on start up companies or product
market regulations may depress employment by reducing the responsiveness of
labor demand with respect to labor costs. We formalize a similar idea using a
simple matching model with entry and dismissal costs to illustrate the interac-
tion between regulations of entry and employment protection legislation, and,
then, present evidence of the separate and joint effects of regulations in labor
and product markets using social security data for Italy.
Italy is an interesting country to study because it is one of the more heavily
regulated OECD economies both in terms of barriers to entrepreneurship and
in terms of employment protection. Djankov et al. (2002) report that an en-
trepreneur in Italy has to follow 16 different procedures, pay US$3,946 in fees,
and wait at least 62 business days to acquire the necessary permits to be able
to start a business. Also, according to Nicoletti et al. (2000), Italy ranks third,
1For example, see Bertrand and Kramarz (2002); Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003); Boeri,
Scarpetta, and Nicoletti (2000); Fonseca, Lopez-Garcia and Pissarides (2001); Gersbach and
Schniewind (2001); Messina (2003); and Nickell (1999).
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after Turkey and Korea, in terms of the strictness of regulations that gener-
ate barriers to entrepreneurship, but they also find that the strictness of these
regulations vary across sectors within Italy. Moreover, according to the same
study, Italy ranks third in terms of the strictness of regulations on permanent
contracts. More importantly for our analysis, Italy introduced a labor market
reform after 1990 which increased employment protection for workers employed
under permanent contracts in firms with less than 15 employees relative to those
in firms with more than 15 employees. This reform, together with variation
in the regulations of entry across sectors, allows us to identify the interaction
between product and labor market regulations in Italy.
The theoretical section of the paper presents a simple matching model with
entry and dismissals costs. Entry costs reflect barriers to entry generated
by the costly administrative burdens documented by Nicoletti et al. (2000)
and Djankov et al. (2002). Dismissal costs capture the strict employment
protection regulation in the form of indemnities for unjust dismissals, advance
notice requirements, and other procedural inconveniences. In the model, higher
entry costs reduce job creation, because the higher are entry costs the more
sensitive is job creation to the probability of filling vacancies. However, entry
costs have no effect on job destruction because these costs are sunk. Moreover,
while a reduction in dismissal costs increases job creation and job destruction,
the increase in job creation as a result of lower dismissal costs is smaller the
higher are entry costs. Consequently, an important implication of the model is
that stricter regulation of entry reduces the effectiveness of labor market reforms
in generating new jobs.
The empirical analysis uses an employer-employee panel from the Italian
Social Security Institute (INPS) to examine how the 1990 Italian labor market
reform affected worker flows in sectors subject to heavy regulations of entry and
those subject to lighter regulations. Our results suggest the 1990 reform reduced
accessions to permanent contracts, specially for women. Moreover, consistent
with the predictions of the theory, the results suggest the effect of the reform
in terms of reduced accessions for women was smaller in sectors with heavy
regulations of entry. The results also suggest the reform reduced separations
from permanent contracts and that, for women, the reduction in separations
was smaller in regulated sectors. An important implication of our findings is
that for labor market deregulation to be effective in terms of generating new
jobs, countries also have to reduce administrative burdens and eliminate other
regulations that create barriers to entrepreneurship.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes regulations
in product and labor markets in Italy as well as recent reforms. Section III
presents a theoretical framework to analyze the impact of entry and dismissal
costs on turnover and employment. Section IV explains the identification strat-
egy used to evaluate the impact of product and labor market regulations in Italy.
Section V describes the Social Security data and presents estimates of the im-
pact of increased strictness of employment protection in small firms in Italy after
1990, and its interaction with entry regulations, on turnover and employment.
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2 Regulations in Italy
2.1 Employment Protection Regulations
Italy, together with the other Southern European countries, is considered one
of the strictest countries in terms of employment protection legislation (EPL).
For example, a study by Lazear (1990) for the period 1956-84 and a study by
Bertola (1990) for the late 1980’s rank Italy as the strictest country in terms of
EPL. A study by the OECD’s Employment Outlook for the late 1980’s, ranks
Portugal as the strictest country followed by Italy, Spain, and Greece. A similar
study by the OECD’s Employment Outlook for the late 1990’s, which includes
Turkey, North America, and Transition Economies as well, continues to rank
Portugal as the strictest, followed by Turkey, Greece, Italy and Spain. The
study by Nicoletti et al. (2000), which does not include some of the countries in
the OECD’s Employment Outlook study, also ranks Italy third, after Portugal
and the Netherlands, in terms of the strictness of regulations on permanent
contracts.
Dismissals were first regulated in Italy in 1966 through Law No. 604, which
established that, in case of unfair dismissal, employers had to either hire back
workers or pay severance, which depended on tenure and firm size. Severance
pay for unfair dismissals ranged between 5 and 8 months for workers with less
than two and a half years of tenure, between 5 and 12 months for those between
two and a half and 20 years of tenure, and between 5 and 14 months for workers
with more than 20 years of tenure in firms with more than 60 employees.2 Firms
with less than 60 employees had to pay half the severance paid by firms with
more than 60 employees. In 1970, the Statuto dei Lavoratori (Law No. 300)
established that all firms with more than 15 employees had to hire back workers
and pay their foregone wages in case of unfair dismissals, but exempted firms
with less than 15 employees.3 A number of recent studies show evidence of the
binding effect of this law for firms at the 15 employee threshold. For example,
the last annual report by the Italian Statistical Office, ISTAT, shows a larger
fraction transiting to a smaller size category for firms around the 15 employee
threshold than for firms at any other sizes. Similarly, Garibaldi, Pacelli and
Borgarello (2003) find a higher probability of inaction and a higher probability
of reducing firm size than of increasing it for firms at the 15 employee threshold.
Given the high costs of unfair dismissals for larger firms, in 1987 the Italian
government liberalized the use of temporary contracts in an attempt to pro-
vide more flexibility to employers. Prior to 1987, temporary contracts could
be used for specific projects, seasonal work, or for replacement of temporarily
absent permanent workers. After 1987, temporary contracts could be used
more widely subject to collective agreements specifying certain target groups.
2By contrast, severance pay for fair dismissals is paid from workers’ retained earnings, so
they entail no cost to employers.
3Boeri and Jimeno (2003) present a theoretical explanation of why these exemptions may
be in place to begin with. They argue that exempting small firms reduces the disemployment
effect of EPL, because small firms subject to EPL have to pay much higher efficiency wages
to discourage shirking than large firms.
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While the extended use of temporary contracts allowed for more flexibility in
the labor market, these contracts could only be renewed up to two times and
could only have a maximum length of 15 months. Consequently, even though
temporary contracts were liberalized after this reform, the use of temporary
contracts remained heavily regulated in Italy compared to other countries.4
Moreover, soon after the 1987 reform, Law No. 108 was introduced in 1990
further restricting dismissals for permanent contracts. In particular, this law
introduced severance payments of between 2.5 and 6 months pay for unfair
dismissals in firms with less than 15 employees. In contrast, firms with more
than 15 employees still had to hire back workers and pay foregone wages in case
of unfair dismissals. This means that the cost of unfair dismissals for firms
with less than 15 employees increased relative to the cost for firms with more
than 15 employees after 1990.5
In 1997, Italy moved again in the direction of trying to provide firms with a
margin of flexibility by legalizing the use of temporary help agencies. However,
as the 1987 reform, the legalization of temporary help agencies was limited in
that it imposed restrictions on the maximum number of possible renewals of
temporary help workers.6
While the 1990 reform increased the costs of unfair dismissals for permanent
contracts in firms with less than 15 employees relative to firms with more than
15 employees, the 1987 and 1997 reforms introduced flexibility at the margin
by deregulating the use of temporary contracts and temporary layoffs. Since
our data is for the period of 1986 to 1995, in this paper we exploit the temporal
change in dismissal costs generated by the 1990 reform for permanent workers,
which applied differently for small and large firms.7
2.2 Entry Regulations
Italy is not only one of the strictest countries in terms of regulation of the
labor market, but also in terms of regulations in product markets. In their
data set of regulations of entry of start-up firms, Djankov et al. (2002) find that
4Note that, according to the OECD’s Employment Outlook (1999), Italy ranked first in
terms of strictness of the regulation of fixed-term contracts during the 1980’s and it continued
to rank first during the 1990’s.
5 In 1991, the Italian government also introduced another reform aimed at providing fiscal
incentives by reducing payroll taxes (i.e., social security contributions) for firms with more
than 15 employees. As shown in Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz (2003) while an increase in
dismissal costs should reduce both hiring and dismissals, a reduction in payroll taxes should
increase hiring but have no effect on dismissals. Consequently, this reform should had increased
hiring but should not have affected dismissals. In 1992, the government also eliminated a
wage indexation mechanism (Scala Mobile) which had been adopted in 1945 and which applied
to firms of all sizes.
6OECD measures of the strictness of regulations on temporary help agencies ranked Italy
first in the late 1980’s, but ranked Italy 6th in the late 1990’s after Turkey, Greece, Spain,
Portugal and Belgium (Employment Outlook, 1999).
7In our empirical analysis we also tried limiting the sample to the period from 1987 to
1995 to eliminate any possible effect of the liberalization of temporary contracts in 1987, but
the results did not change. In any case, though, we concentrate on permanent workers in our
analysis.
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Italy is one of the most restrictive countries in terms of the number of procedures
required to set-up a business. An entrepreneur in Italy has to follow 16 different
procedures to acquire the necessary permits to start a business, which is the
same number required in Senegal, Ecuador, Romania and Vietnam, and well
above the worldwide average number of 6.04 procedures. This study also finds,
that without taking into account bribes, time and out-of-pocket costs involved
in setting up a business in Italy rise to 45 percent of per capita GDP.
Nicoletti et al. (2000) construct broader measures of product market reg-
ulations which capture: (1) barriers to entrepreneurship (e.g., administrative
burdens on start-ups and corporate firms, licensing and permit systems, exis-
tence of antitrust exceptions for public enterprises), as well as (2) state control
over business enterprises (e.g., size of public enterprise sector, price controls in
competitive industries).8 According to their measure capturing barriers to en-
trepreneurship, Italy ranks third, after Turkey and Korea, in terms of strictness
among 27 OECD countries, followed by France and Belgium. Disaggregating
this measure into what is due to administrative burdens to start-ups, regulatory
opacity, and barriers to competition, Italy ranks first in terms of administrative
burdens to start-ups. Italy also appears heavily regulated in terms of state
involvement. According to Nicoletti et al.’s (2000) measure of state control,
Italy ranks second after Poland. Separating this measure into a measure of
public ownership and involvement in business operations (e.g., price controls),
Italy ranks second after Poland in terms of public ownership and fourth in terms
of state involvement after Spain, Greece, and Belgium.
While Italy is clearly heavily regulated compared to other countries, within
Italy some industries are less heavily regulated than others because many regu-
lations are industry-specific. For example, administrative burdens on start-ups
are particularly heavy in Italy, as in France (see Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002),
for retail distribution companies. Using the OECD international regulation
database, Nicoletti (2001) constructs measures of industry-level regulation for
seven sectors: retail distribution, road freight, mobile telephony, air passenger
transport, fixed telephony, electricity, and railways.9 Using these measures, he
ranks industries as very restrictive, restrictive, liberal, or very liberal, according
to whether the summary indicator of regulation in the industry exceeds by more
or less than one standard deviation the average value for the industry in the
28 OECD countries included in the sample.10 Using these indicators of strict-
8A number of studies have analyzed the impact of product market regulations on em-
ployment, the employment consequences of immigration, productivity, and investment using
these indicators, including Boeri, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2000); Angrist and Kugler (2003);
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003); and Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti, and Schiantarelli (2003).
9See Boylaud (2000) for detailed study of the road freight and retail sectors; Boylaud and
Nicoletti (2001) for a detailed study of the telecommunications sector; Go¨nenc and Nicoletti
(2000) for a detailed study of the air passenger transportation sector; and Go¨nenc, Maher,
and Nicoletti (2001) for a detailed study of each of these sectors.
10The reason for ranking the industry strictness by comparing the industry in a country to
the industry’s average in all countries in the sample is that some industries may be subject
to market failures so that regulation may be justified. This means that it makes sense to
compare Italy’s electricity sector to the electricity sector in other countries rather than to
Italy’s retail distribution sector, which is unlikely to face the same market failures as the
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ness of regulation in the service sector, retail distribution, road freight, mobile
telephony, electricity and railways are ranked as restrictive, while air passenger
transport and fixed telephony are ranked as liberal.11 We also focus in the
textile sector as another sector with low entry restrictions in Italy, which has
been dominated by small firms.
We use the fact that some industries within Italy are subject to strict reg-
ulation of entry while others are faced with lighter entry barriers to study the
differential impact of changes in dismissal costs when product markets are more
or less regulated. The next section presents a model to illustrate how employ-
ment protection and entry regulations, like those present in Italy, interact in
terms of their effects on turnover and employment.
3 Theoretical Effects of EPL and Entry Costs
A simple matching model illustrates the individual and joint effects of employ-
ment protection legislation and regulations on start-ups. The model is similar
to Mortensen and Pissarides’ (1994) but adds dismissal costs and fixed set-up
costs for opening vacancies. Our theoretical model shows the standard effects
of dismissal costs in terms of reducing job creation and job destruction, but
in addition it illustrates how barriers to entry mitigate the effects of dismissal
costs. This means that there are economic complementarities between labor
and product market policies in our model, in the sense that the effectiveness
of one policy depends on the implementation of the other policy.12 Thus, an
important implication of the model is that labor market deregulation will be
less effective in the presence of heavier regulations of entry.
Firms have a discount factor r. There is a fixed set-up cost K of opening a
vacancy and a cost c of holding the vacancy open. There is free entry, so that
the value of a vacancy is equal to the fixed set-up cost in equilibrium. The
number of matches in the economy are given by m (u, v), which depend on the
unemployment and vacancy rates u and v, since the labor force is normalized
to one. The matching function is assumed to increase in both u and v and
electricity sector.
11While some of these sectors have been affected by regulatory reform, the most important
changes in the regulatory environment occurred after the period we study (see Goglio (2001)
for a detailed description of these reforms). For example, Telecom Italia was privatised in
1997 and telecommunications services were fully liberalized also in 1997. In electricity, ENEL
(the public legal monopoly until then) became a joint stock company in 1991. However, it was
only until 1999 that the sector was fully liberalized by introducing functional unbundlying of
the industry and limiting the generation and import of ENEL to 50%. Similarly in railways,
Ferrovie dello Stato (the integrated public monopolist until then), was transformed into a joint
stock company in 1992. However, it was only until 1999 that the law requires legal separation
between the network operators and the service company and that international operators are
allowed to access this market.
12Orszag and Snower (1999) discuss economic and political complementarities between un-
employment benefits and taxes, where political complementarities arise when the ability to
gain political consent for one policy depends on the implementation of the other policies.
Glanchard and Giavazzi (2003) instead discuss political complementarities between labor mar-
ket regulations that determine the bargaining power of workers and entry regulations.
7
to be homogeneous of degree one. Accordingly, the arrival rate of applicants
is m(u,v)v = m
¡1
θ , 1
¢
= q (θ) with q0 (θ) < 0. As in Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994), jobs are assumed to start at the highest possible level of productivity,
εm, but jobs are subject to productivity shocks with instantaneous probability
λ, where the new match-specific productivity, ε0, is drawn from a distribution
function G(·) on the support [ε0, εm]. Jobs hit by shocks are either terminated
or continued, and if they are terminated they have to pay a dismissal cost F ,
which is assumed to be pure waste. Every period, firms pay a wage w(ε),
w(ε) = φε+ (1− φ) b
where b is the reservation wage of the worker and where the wage is a weighted
sum of the productivity of the match and the reservation wage.13
The values of filled and vacant jobs are,
rJ (ε) = ε− w (ε) + λ
Z ε
ε0
[−F − J (ε)] dG (ε0)
+λ
Z εm
ε
[J (ε0)− J (ε)] dG (ε0) (1)
rV = −c+ q(θ) [J (εm)− V ] , (2)
where ε is the threshold match-specific productivity at which firms are indif-
ferent between dismissing and retaining the worker. It is straightforward to
show that J (ε) is increasing in ε and there exists a threshold match-specific
productivity ε ∈ [ε0, εm], given by the condition J (ε) = −F, such that workers
are dismissed whenever ε ≤ ε and they are retained whenever ε > ε.
Imposing this condition on equation (2) and integrating by parts, the job
destruction schedule is given by the following equation,
0 = rF + (1− φ) (ε− b) + λ1− φr + λ
Z εm
ε
[1−G(ε0)] dε0. (3)
Consequently, the job destruction schedule is flat and it decreases as dis-
missal costs, F , increase, but does not shift with changes in entry costs, K.
The later occurs because entry costs are sunk, so they do not affect dismissal
decisions.
Free entry implies that the number of vacancies is determined by zero net
profits, so that the value of a vacancy equals the entry cost, V = K. Sub-
stituting the free entry condition into the value of a vacancy in equation (2)
13This is the same as the wage in a model in which wage determination is charachterized
by Nash bargaining and workers have no bargaining power. By continuity, there is a positive
bargaining power, under which our results below hold in a standard matching model with
bargaining power. While our results hold for a low enough bargaining power of the workers,
we keep this wage determination mechanism for simplicity.
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yields,
J (εm) =
rK + c
q(θ) +K
where the first term captures the expected flow opportunity cost of opening
a vacancy and the second term the cost to be paid up front upon opening.
Combining this condition and the job destruction condition and using the fact
that J 0 (ε) = 1−φr+λ , we get the job creation schedule,
1− φ
r + λ (εm − ε)−
µ
rK + c
q(θ) +K + F
¶
= 0. (4)
The job creation schedule slopes downward. The higher is the threshold that
induces dismissals, the lower is the value of a job and the smaller the incentives
to open new vacancies. In addition, increases in both dismissal and entry costs
reduce the incentives to open new vacancies, shifting down the job creation
schedule (i.e., dεdF = −
r+λ
1−φ < 0 and
dε
dK = −
r+λ
1−φ
³
1 + rq(θ)
´
< 0).14 In addition,
note that the entry cost, K, affects the slope of the job creation schedule. As
K increases, the job creation schedule becomes steeper because firms are more
careful about creating new jobs, so that a lower probability of filling the vacancy
reduces job creation by more.
Given the job creation and job destruction schedules, the equilibrium values
of the dismissal threshold and the labor market tightness parameter, ε∗ and θ∗,
are given by equations (3) and (4) (see Figure 1). An increase in dismissal costs
reduces the dismissal threshold and labor market tightness. The effects on the
equilibrium value of ε∗ are determined by the job destruction equation, which
is independent of θ∗, so an increase in dismissal costs reduces dismissals, i.e.,
dε∗
dF = −
(r+λ)
(1−φ)
r
[r+λG(ε)] < 0. On the other hand, entry costs have no effect on
dismissals. The effects on the equilibrium level of θ∗ are determined by the job
creation schedule, so both dismissal costs and entry costs reduce hiring, i.e.,
dθ∗
dK =
r + q (θ∗)
rK + c
q (θ∗)
q0 (θ∗) < 0
dθ∗
dF =
λG(ε∗)
[r + λG(ε∗)]
(q (θ∗))2
q0 (θ∗) (rK + c) < 0.
The negative effect of K on θ∗ is clear. The entry cost reduces job creation while
not affecting job destruction, hence the ratio of vacancies to unemployment
decreases (see Figure 2). The negative effect of F on θ∗ is due to the fact that
an increase in F reduces job creation more than job destruction. The reason is
14Note that the reduction in job creation as a result of an increase in entry costs is greater
than the reduction due to an increase in dismissal costs. This is because the entry cost
generates both an up front cost and a flow cost rKq(θ) , while the firing cost only generates an
up front cost.
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that firing costs affect entry due to the lower profits realized at any realization
of the shock, while they have an effect on destruction only in bad states of the
world (see Figure 3).
In addition, the effect of an increase in dismissal costs on hiring will be
smaller, the higher are entry costs, i.e., d
2θ∗
dFdK > 0. This is because the higher
are entry costs, the more sensitive is job creation to the probability of filling
vacancies, so higher dismissal costs generate a smaller reduction in hiring or,
vice-versa, lower dismissal costs generate a smaller increase in hiring. Figure 4
shows the effects of an increase in firing costs at different levels of entry costs.
The figure shows that higher entry costs shift the job creation down and also
increases the slope of the job creation schedule. Consequently, a change in
dismissal costs has a smaller effect on labor market tightness the higher are
entry costs.15 An important implication of these results is that labor market
deregulation will be less effective if entry is heavily regulated.
4 Identification Strategy
The goals of this paper are: first, to identify the impact of dismissal costs on
permanent employment, and, second, to identify how the impact of dismissal
costs varies with the strictness of entry regulations. To identify the impact of
increases in dismissal costs, we compare firms with less than 15 employees to
firms with more than 15 employees before and after the 1990 reform. To deal
with the possibility that firm size may be affected by the reform itself, we use
firm size during the pre-reform period which is highly correlated with current
firm size, but not affected by the reform. In particular, we use the average firm
size during the pre-reform period to assign firms to the smaller or bigger than
15 employees groups.16 Moreover, to identify how the impact of dismissal costs
varies with the strictness of entry regulations, we compare firms with less than
15 employees relative to firms with more than 15 employees in sectors subject
to heavier and lighter regulations of entry, before and after the 1990 reform.
The strategy to identify the impact of the change in dismissal costs is illus-
trated in Figures 5-6. Figures 5 and 6 show accession and separation proba-
bilities in firms with less than 15 employees relative to firms with more than
15 employees for the period 1986 to 1995. Figure 5 shows a sharp decline in
accession probabilities in small relative to big firms starting in 1990. Figure 6
also shows a decline in the separation probabilities starting in 1989, possibly in
anticipation of the reforms. Figures 7 and 8 also show accession and separation
probabilities for small firms relative to big firms, but separating firms into reg-
ulated and unregulated sectors according to the Nicoletti (2001) classification.
Figure 7 shows that while accession probabilities decreased after 1990 in both
regulated and unregulated sectors, the decline was greater in unregulated sec-
15This is similar to the reduction in the labor demand elasticity generated by the constraint
on entrepreneurship in Krueger and Pischke’s (1997) model.
16The correlation between the average firm size during the pre- and post-reform periods is
0.95.
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tors as predicted by the theory. By contrast, Figure 8 shows that the decline
in separation probabilities was greatest in the regulated sectors.17
To control for the possibility that reduced accessions and separations are the
result of other shocks occurring during the post-reform period, we estimate the
following linear probability model which controls for year and size effects, and
for observable worker and firm characteristics:
E[mijt = 1|Xijt,DSj , Postt] = τ t + Sj + β0Xijt + δ(DSj × Postt) + vijt, (5)
where mijt = 1 if a match was created or destroyed, i.e., if there was either an
accession or a separation, for person i in firm j at time t; τ t is a year effect; Sj
is a size effect; Postt is a dummy that takes the value of 1 after 1990 and zero
otherwise; and DSj is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the worker is employed
in a small firm, i.e., a firm with less than 15 employees during the pre-reform
period, and 0 if the worker is employed in a big firm; and Xijt includes worker
characteristics such as age, occupation, and gender, and firm characteristics
such as location and sectoral productivity. The interaction term between the
small firm dummy and the post-reform dummy is included to capture the effects
of interest.
While inclusion of time effects allows controlling for the possibility that the
change in turnover after the post-reform period was due to macro shocks, it is
possible that the business cycle affects small and large firms differently. If this
were the case, then we should have observed both reduced accessions and in-
creased separations during the post-reform period due to the strong recession in
1992 and 1993. Instead, Figures 5 and 6 above show reduced accessions and sep-
arations. Nonetheless, we also estimate the following alternative specification
allowing for size-specific cyclical effects:
E[mijt = 1|Xijt,DSj , Postt, Et] = τ t + Sj + β0Xijt + φEt + ρ(DSj × Et)
+δ(DSj × Postt × Et) + v0ijt, (6)
where Et is an expansion variable which is either an expansion dummy taking
the value of 0 during the recession years of 1992 and 1993 and 1 otherwise, or
GDP growth. Here the impact of the reform is captured by the coefficient
on the interaction of the small dummy, the post dummy and the expansion
variable, which now measures the impact of the reforms during the post-reform
expansion relative to the pre-reform expansion. The size-specific cyclical effect
is captured by the coefficient on the interaction term between the small dummy
and the expansion variable. Since we are also interested in how the effects of
dismissal costs vary with the strictness of regulations of entry, we estimate the
effects of interest both for the regulated and unregulated sectors.
17The results below show that this is driven by the results for men, as the impact of the
reform on women’s separations was smaller in the regulated sector. Note that our theory does
not make any predictions on the relative impact of increased dismissal costs on separations in
regulated and unregulated sectors.
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5 Estimates of the Effects of EPL and Entry
Costs
5.1 Data Description
The dataset is drawn from the Italian Social Security Administration (INPS)
archives for the years 1986-1995. The original dataset collects social security
forms of a 1/90 random sample employees every year, with employees born
on the 10th of March, June, September, and December of every year being
sampled. The original archives only include information on private sector firms
in the manufacturing and service sectors, so that it excludes all workers in the
public sector and agriculture. We use a 10% random sample from this original
dataset.
The dataset includes individual longitudinal records generated using social
security numbers. However, since the INPS collects information on private sec-
tor employees for the purpose of computing retirement benefits, employees are
only followed through their employment spells. The data, thus, stops following
individuals who move into self-employment, the underground economy, unem-
ployment, and retirement. The dataset also includes longitudinal records for
firms employing the randomly selected workers in the sample using the firms’
name, address, and social security and fiscal codes.18 The dataset is, thus, an
employer-employee panel with information on workers and firm characteristics.
In particular, the data includes information on employees’s age, gender, occu-
pation, dates of accession and separation with each firm, and type of contract,
and information on firms’ location, sector of employment, number of employ-
ees, and firms’ dates of incorporation and termination. The advantage of this
administrative data for the purpose of studying worker transitions is that, con-
trary to survey data which measures transitions by matching quarterly data
and using tenure information to identify job changes, it identifies exact dates
of accessions and separations according to when social security contributions
began and ended.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics by firm size, before and after the 1990
reform. The table shows lower accession rates for men and women after the
reform in small and large firms. However, the table shows a larger drop in ac-
cession rates after the reform in small than in large firms. Similarly, separation
rates are lower for men and women after the reform in small and large firms, but
the drop in separation rates was much more pronounced in small firms. These
simple comparisons of means illustrate the impact of increased dismissal costs
on accessions and separations in small relative to big firms.
Tables 2 and 3 present descriptive statistics for men and women, respec-
tively, by firm size in regulated and less regulated sectors, before and after the
1990 reform. The sample in this table includes only those in sectors which
can be classified as more or less restrictive in terms of product market regula-
18While the dataset includes a random sample of workers, the probability that a firm is
selected increases with size.
12
tions. In particular, this sample includes workers and firms in the retail, road
transportation, electricity, telecommunications, air transportation, and textile
sectors. Following Nicoletti’s (2001) ranking of industries, we classify retail,
road transportation, electricity and telecommunications as regulated and air
transportation and textiles as less regulated. As Table 1, these table shows
that accession and separation rates fell after the reform in small relative to
large firms. In addition, these tables show that reduced accession rates after
the reform were smaller in regulated sectors. This is consistent with the idea
that higher entry costs mitigate the turnover effects of dismissal costs. The
next section presents regression results which control for covariates.
5.2 Effects on Accessions
Table 4 reports marginal effects of a linear probability model for accessions
estimated using equations (5) and (6). The dependent variable is a variable
that takes the value of 1 if the person joined a firm in a given year and zero
otherwise. The basic specification controls for age, occupation dummies, and
size and year effects. The effect of interest is captured by the interaction
between the post-reform dummy and a dummy for firms under 15 employees
during the pre-reform period. The reported standard errors allow for clustering
by period-size group to control for common random effects within these cells.
Panels A and B of Table 4 show the results for men and women, respectively.
The results show a large and statistically significant decline in permanent ac-
cessions in small relative to large firms after the 1990 reform was introduced.
Column (1) shows that accession probabilities decreased by 0.0306 or 13.1% for
men and by 0.0359 or 16.2% for women in small relative to big firms during
the reform years. Including sector-specific trends and sector productivity in
columns (2) and (3) reduces the effects on accession probabilities to between
0.0246 and 0.0251 for men and to between 0.0335 and 0.0339 for women.
Columns (4) and (5) of Table 4 report the results controlling for size-specific
cyclical effects as in equation (6). The results for men in Panel A show a
smaller effect of between 0.0232 and 0.0171 (or between 9.9% and 7.3%) using
the expansion dummy and GDP growth, respectively, to control for size-specific
cyclical effects. By contrast, the results for women now show bigger effects of
between 0.0468 and 0.0507 (or between 21.2% and 23%) when the size-specific
cyclical effect is controlled with the expansion dummy and GDP growth, respec-
tively. The much larger reduction in hiring as a result of increased dismissal
costs for women than for men is consistent with the view that dismissal costs
have a larger effect on outsiders than insiders.
Table 5 shows the marginal effects of models which include interactions with
a regulated sector dummy, which allow to contrast how the effect differs be-
tween regulated and unregulated sectors. The third level interaction on the
small dummy, the post-90 dummy, and the regulated dummy captures the dif-
ferential effect of the increase in unfair dismissal costs in the regulated relative
to the unregulated sector. As in Table 4, the results show reduced accessions
for men and women in small relative to big firms during the reform years. The
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results for men show no differential effects of the reform in regulated and unreg-
ulated sectors. By contrast, the results for women show a smaller reduction in
accessions in regulated relative to unregulated sectors. The results for women
are consistent with the idea that the effect of the reforms in terms of reduced
hiring should be smaller in sectors faced with higher entry costs.
5.3 Effects on Separations
Table 6 reports marginal effects of a linear probability model for separations.
The dependent variable is now a variable that takes the value of 1 if the person
separated from the firm in a given year and zero otherwise.19 As before, Panel
A reports the results for men and Panel B for women. The results show that
separation probabilities decreased for both men and women. For example, the
results from the basic specification show a decrease in separation probabilities of
0.0615 or 18.9% for men and of 0.0637 or 19.8% for women. After controlling
for sector-specific trends and sector productivity, the effects drop to 0.0607
and 0.0623 for men and women, respectively. The results controlling for size-
specific cyclical effects in Columns (4) and (5) of Table 6 show smaller, but still
substantial and significant, effects of between 0.0551 and 0.0579 (or between
17% and 17.8%) for men and larger effects of between 0.0861 and 0.0899 (or
between 26.8% and 27.9%) for women.
Table 7 shows the marginal effects of models which include interactions with
a regulated sector dummy. The effects of the reform become insignificant for
men, but, as in Table 6, the results for women show reduced separations in
small relative to big firms after the reform. Moreover, the results for men show
bigger effects of the reform on separations in regulated sectors, while the results
for women show bigger effects in the less regulated sectors.20
5.4 Net Employment Effects
The effects of the reform on net employment can be determined using the fol-
lowing steady state conditions,
λSeS = θSu,
λLeL = θLu,
where λS = λG (ε∗S), θS = θ∗Sq (θ∗S), λL = λG (ε∗L), and θL = θ∗Lq (θ∗L) . The
first steady-state condition requires the flow into unemployment out of small
firms to be equal to the flow out of unemployment into small firms, and the
second condition requires the flow into unemployment out of large firms to
be equal to the flow out of unemployment into large firms. In addition, the
following identity must hold:
19The controls in these specifications are as in the linear probability models for accessions.
20 Our theoretical analysis in Section 3 does not predict anything about the differencial
impact of dismissal costs on separations in regulated or unregulated sectors.
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u = 1− e,
where,
e = [pS × eS + (1− pS) × eL] ,
where pS is he share of employment in small firms. Using the two steady-state
conditions and the identity to solve for employment yields:
e =
·
pSλLθS + (1− pS)λSθL
λSλL + pSλLθS + (1− pS)λSθL
¸
.
The results above suggest accessions and separations decreased by 7.3% and
17.8% for men. Using these results together with average accessions and sepa-
ration rates in small and large firms and the share of employment in small firms
before the reform in the top panel of Table 1, suggests an increase in men´s
employment due to the reform of a little under 1%. In contrast, the results
for women suggest greater decreases in accessions and separations of 23% and
27.9%, respectively. Combining these results with the average accession and
separation rates in small and large firms and the share of employment in small
firms for women before the reform in Panel B of Table 1, suggests a decline
in women´s employment of about 1% as a result of the reform. The results
for men show increased employment due to increased dismissal costs for insid-
ers, but negative employment effects for women, who are likely to be outsiders.
Moreover, the results for women, above, show greater effects of the reform in
unregulated sectors, especially in terms of accessions, suggesting that most of
the losses in employment after the increase in dismissal costs occurred in less
regulated sectors.
6 Conclusion
Labor and product market regulations have often been blamed for the high
unemployment in Europe. Yet, the empirical evidence on the impact of these
regulations is mixed. In this paper, we present new evidence on the impact
of dismissal costs on turnover and employment and ask how the employment
consequences of dismissal costs vary with the strictness of entry regulations.
We first present a model, which shows that while dismissal costs reduce both
accessions and separations, the impact of dismissal costs on hiring is mitigated
when entry costs are higher. This is because the higher are entry costs, the
more careful are firms in creating new jobs. This result, thus, suggests that
barriers to entry reduce the effectiveness of labor market deregulation.
We use an employer-employee panel from the Italian Social Security to ex-
amine the impact of labor and product market regulations empirically. We
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exploit the fact that dismissal costs increased after 1990 in Italy for firms with
less than 15 employees relative to larger firms. Our estimates suggest the 1990
reform reduced accessions by 7.3% and 23% for men and women, respectively.
In addition, our estimates suggest a reduction in separations of 17.8% and 27.9%
for men and women, respectively, as a result of the reform. These results are
robust to the inclusion of sector fixed effects, sector-specific trends, sectoral pro-
ductivity, and size-specific cyclical effects. Combining these results with the
steady-state conditions from the model suggests increased employment due to
the rise in dismissal costs for men, who are more likely to be insiders, but a
decline of about 1% in the employment of women, who are more likely to be
outsiders.
We then look at the impact of the 1990 reform on turnover in sectors sub-
ject to more and less restrictive entry regulations. While several authors have
documented very costly administrative burdens in Italy, these authors also doc-
ument the variability in entry regulation across sectors within Italy. We exploit
this variability together with the changes in dismissal costs after 1990 for small
relative to large firms to examine how labor and product market regulations
interact. Our results suggest a smaller impact of the 1990 reform on accessions
in regulated than in less regulated sectors, especially for women. An important
implication of our theoretical and empirical findings is that for labor market
deregulation to be effective in terms of generating new jobs, countries also have
to eliminate administrative burdens that generate barriers to entrepreneurship.
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Figure 2: Comparative Statics with Respect to Entry Costs, K 
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Figure 3: Comparative Statics with Respect to Dismissal Costs, F 
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Figure 4: Effects of an Increase in Dismissal Costs (from F0 to F1)  
in Economies with Different Entry Costs (KA < KB). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JCB(F0) 
JDA(F1) = J DB(F1) ** 
* 
 
JCA(F0) 
JDA(F0)= J DB(F0) 
 
F0 < F1 
Figure 5
sm
all
Probability of accessions in firms < 16
year of observation
1985 1990 1995
.414474
.592593
24
Figure 6
sm
all
Probability of a separation in firms < 16
year of observation
1985 1990 1995
.341615
.607143
25
Figure 7
Probability of accessions in firms<16 size by sector
year of observation
 smallreg  smallunreg
1985 1990 1995
.175
.677686
26
Figure 8
Probability of separations in firms<16 size by sector
year of observation
 smallreg  smallunreg
1985 1990 1995
.190476
.708791
27
 28 
 
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics by Firm Size, Before and After Reforms (Full Sample) 
 
Variables Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform  Post-reform 
     
 Small Firms  Large Firms 
     
 A. Men 
     
Age 35.79 
(11.32) 
36.99 
(10.75) 
39.70 
(10.56) 
40.73 
(10.04) 
% Blue Collar Workers .8052 
(.3961) 
.8085 
(.3935) 
.6268 
(.4837) 
.5959 
(.4907) 
Average Firm Size 6.485 
(3.9765) 
6.897 
(4.155) 
6,725.32 
(22,087.87) 
7,289.11 
(22,621.88) 
Accession Rate .2337 
(.4232) 
.1877 
(.3905) 
.1251 
(.3308) 
.1115 
(.3148) 
Separation Rate .3247 
(.4683) 
.2555 
(.4361) 
.1740 
(.3791) 
.1648 
(.3710) 
     
N 12,321 12,640 27,599 32,729 
     
 B. Women 
     
Age 32.18 
(9.721) 
34.05 
(9.4) 
35.38 
(9.7) 
37.10 
(9.445) 
% Blue Collar Workers .4170 
(.4931) 
.4254 
(.4944) 
.4754 
(.4994) 
.4427 
(.4967) 
Average Firm Size 6.3218 
(3.9831) 
6.584 
(4.1623) 
2,521.73 
(12,125.36) 
3,023.13 
(13,063.76) 
Accession Rate .2212 
(.4151) 
.1692 
(.3750) 
.1318 
(.3383) 
.1192 
(.3241) 
Separation Rate .3218 
(.4672) 
.2415 
(.4280) 
.1924 
(.3942) 
.1780 
(.3825) 
     
N 7,228 6,796 11,812 13,748 
     
 
Notes:  Only permanent workers are included.  The pre-reform period goes from 1986 to 1990 and the post-reform period from 1991 to 1995.  
Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics for Men by Firm Size,  
Before and After the Reform (Regulation Sample) 
 
Variables Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform  Post-reform 
     
 Small Firms  Large Firms 
     
 A. Regulated Sectors  
     
Age 36.09 
(11.31) 
38.17 
(10.60) 
40.77 
(10.11) 
41.85 
(9.857) 
% Blue Collar Workers .7240 
(.4471) 
.7286 
(.4448) 
.6332 
(.4820) 
.5481 
(.4977) 
Average Firm Size 5.658 
(4.102) 
6.0139 
(4.275) 
36,243.54 
(47,379.08) 
36,483.39 
(47,024.12) 
Accession Rate .1929 
(.3947) 
.1621 
(.3687) 
.0796 
(.2707) 
.0675933 
(.251081) 
Separation Rate .2652 
(.4416) 
.2157 
(.4115) 
.0970 
(.2960) 
.1142 
(.3181) 
     
N 1,493 1,437 2,639 3,669 
     
 B. Unregulated Sectors  
     
Age 34.99 
(9.766) 
38.60 
(10.51) 
40.48 
(11.23) 
39.69 
(10.32) 
% Blue Collar Workers .7746 
(.4193) 
.7744 
(.4193) 
.7396 
(.4391) 
.7494 
(.4336) 
Average Firm Size 8.704 
(3.486) 
9.049 
(3.603) 
953.3 
(3,194.91) 
1,413.34 
(3,902.25) 
Accession Rate .1549 
(.3631) 
.1098 
(.3135) 
.0917 
(.2888) 
.0726 
(.2596) 
Separation Rate .2183 
(.4146) 
.1707 
(.3774) 
.1748 
(.3800) 
.1145 
(.3186) 
     
N 142 164 818 882 
     
 
Notes:  Only permanent workers are included.  The pre-reform period goes from 1986 to 1990 and the post-reform period from 1991 to 1995.  
The regulation sample includes workers and firms in the retail, road transportation, electricity, telecommunications, air transportation and 
textile sectors.  The retail, road transportation, electricity, and telecommunications are classified as regulated, while the air transportation and 
textile sectors are classified as unregulated.  Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
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Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics for Women by Firm Size,  
Before and After the Reforms (Regulation Sample) 
 
Variables Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform  Post-reform 
     
 Small Firms  Large Firms 
     
 A. Regulated Sectors  
     
Age 32.10 
(9.864) 
34.52 
(9.568) 
36.64 
(8.780) 
38.34 
(9.759) 
% Blue Collar Workers .2490 
(.4326) 
.2668 
(.4426) 
.1485 
(.3559) 
.1571 
(.3641) 
Average Firm Size 4.739 
(3.520) 
5.277 
(3.8) 
14,675.81 
(32,121.72) 
18,831.17 
(36,654.68) 
Accession Rate .1255 
(.3315) 
.1261 
(.3321) 
.1072 
(.3096) 
.0761 
(.2653) 
Separation Rate .2238 
(.4170) 
.1812 
(.3854) 
.1378 
(.3450) 
.1264 
(.3325) 
     
N 956 817 653 815 
     
 B. Unregulated Sectors  
     
Age 32.16 
(10.89) 
35.18 
(10.77) 
34.72 
(10.28) 
36.66  
(9.910) 
% Blue Collar Workers .8698 
(.3370) 
.8358 
(.3710) 
.7977 
(.4019) 
.7669 
(.4231) 
Average Firm Size 7.175 
(3.610) 
7.381 
(3.850) 
310.94 
(1,102.11) 
784.57 
(2,694.88) 
Accession Rate .1154 
(.320) 
.1026 
(.3039) 
.0691 
(.2538) 
.0949 
(.2932) 
Separation Rate .2456 
(.4311) 
.1935 
(.3957) 
.1508 
(.3580) 
.1474 
(.3547) 
     
N 338 341 796 875 
     
 
Notes:  Only permanent workers are included.  The pre-reform period goes from 1986 to 1990 and the post-reform period from 1991 to 1995.  
The regulation sample includes workers and firms in the retail, road transportation, electricity, telecommunications, air transportation and 
textile sectors.  The retail, road transportation, electricity, and telecommunications are classified as regulated, while the air transportation and 
textile sectors are classified as unregulated.  Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
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Table 4:  Effects of the 1990 Reforms on Accessions (Full Sample) 
 
      
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
      
A. Men (N = 85,222) 
      
Post-1990  .01227 (.0125) 
.0066 
(.0079) 
.0073 
(.0081) 
.0095 
(.0090) 
-.0016 
(.0096) 
Small Firms .0674* (.0027) 
.0647* 
(.0025) 
.0648* 
(.0026) 
.0647* 
(.0026) 
.0513** 
(.0131) 
Post-1990  Small Firms  -.0306* (.0011) 
-.0251* 
(.0030) 
-.0246* 
(.0030) 
-.0232* 
(.0031) 
-.0171** 
(.0066) 
      
B. (N = 39,548) 
      
Post-1990  .0110 (.0315) 
-.0025 
(.0118) 
.0006 
(.0106) 
.0096 
(.0113) 
.0051 
(.0077) 
Small Firms .0710* (.0029) 
.0703* 
(.0020) 
.0697* 
(.0021) 
.0698* 
(.0021) 
.1002** 
(.0196) 
Post-1990  Small Firms  -.0359* (.0012) 
-.0339* 
(.0008) 
-.0335* 
(.0008) 
-.0468* 
(.0009) 
-.0507** 
(.0102) 
      
Sector Fixed Effects YES NO NO NO NO 
Sector-specific Trends NO YES YES YES YES 
Sectoral Productivity NO NO YES YES YES 
Recession Dummy NO NO NO YES NO 
GDP Growth Rate NO NO NO NO YES 
      
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parenthesis allow for clustering by period/size.  All specifications control for region and year effects, age, a 
gender dummy, a white-collar dummy, and total number of employees in the firm.  Some specifications include sector fixed effects and 
others include sector-specific trends and sectoral productivity, which is calculated as value-added deflated using a sector-level PPI over the 
number of workers using 1995  as the base year.  Columns (4) and (5) control for size-specific cyclical effects.  Column (4) interacts the small 
size dummy with an expansion dummy, which takes the value of 0 for 1992-1993 and 1 otherwise, while columns (5) interacts the small size 
dummy with GDP growth.  * Denotes significance at the 1% level and ** denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 5:  Effects of the 1990 Reforms on Accessions (Regulation Sample) 
 
      
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
 
A. Men (N = 11,232) 
      
Regulated Sector  -.0207 (.0313) 
-33.67 
(38.29) 
-33.84 
(37.02) 
-33.26 
(38.10) 
-34.85 
(35.91) 
Post-1990 .0016 (.0210) 
.0077 
(.0398) 
.0082 
(.0381) 
.0110 
(.0430) 
.0137 
(.0332) 
Small Firms  .0404* (.0030) 
.0418* 
(.0030) 
.0419* 
(.0030) 
.0418* 
(.0030) 
.0547* 
(.0134) 
Post-1990  Small Firms -.0064 (.0029) 
-.0089** 
(.0039) 
-.0089** 
(.0039) 
-.0331* 
(.0040) 
-.0162** 
(.0064) 
Post-1990  Regulated Sector .0178* (.0024) 
.0125 
(.0458) 
.0176 
(.0445) 
.0175 
(.0495) 
.0102 
(.0423) 
Small Firms  Regulated Sector .0362* (.0093) 
.0383** 
(.0118) 
.0389** 
(.0117) 
.0386** 
(.0118) 
.0046 
(.0173) 
Post-1990  Small Firms   
Regulated Sector 
-.0120** 
(.0042) 
-.0148 
(.0114) 
-.0161 
(.0110) 
.0143 
(.0116) 
.0031 
(.0092) 
 
B. Women (N = 5,581) 
      
Regulated sector  - - - - - 
Post-1990 .0472** (.0141) 
.0366 
(.0215) 
.0372 
(.0212) 
.0562 
(.0252) 
.0409 
(.0279) 
Small Firms  .0360* (.0012) 
.0378* 
(.0017) 
.0378* 
(.0017) 
.0378* 
(.0017) 
.0684 
(.0345) 
Post-1990  Small Firms -.0349* (.0017) 
-.0389* 
(.0014) 
-.0388* 
(.0013) 
-.0487* 
(.0011) 
-.0557** 
(.0187) 
Post-1990  Regulated Sector -.0575* (.0017) 
-.0355 
(.0294) 
-.0318 
(.0292) 
-.0594 
(.0347) 
-.0618 
(.0390) 
Small Firms  Regulated Sector -.0424* (.0016) 
-.0414* 
(.0030) 
-.0412* 
(.0028) 
-.0409* 
(.0026) 
-.0719 
(.0442) 
Post-1990  Small firms   
Regulated Sector 
.0685* 
(.0025) 
.0679* 
(.0059) 
.0675* 
(.0054) 
.0748* 
(.0057) 
.0830* 
(.0218) 
      
Sector Fixed Effects YES NO NO NO NO 
Sector-specific Trends NO YES YES YES YES 
Sectoral Productivity NO NO YES YES YES 
Recession Dummy NO NO NO YES NO 
GDP Growth Rate NO NO NO NO YES 
      
 
Notes: The regulation sample includes workers and firms in the retail, road transportation, electricity, telecommunications, air 
transportation and textile sectors.  The retail, road transportation, electricity, and telecommunications are classified as regulated, while 
the air transportation and textile sectors are classified as unregulated.  Robust standard errors in parenthesis allow for clustering by 
period/size.  All specifications control for region and year effects, age, a gender dummy, a white-collar dummy, and total number of 
employees in the firm.  Some specifications include sector fixed effects, while others include sector-specific trends and sectoral 
productivity, which is calculated as value-added deflated using a sector-level PPI over the number of workers using 1995 as the base 
year.  Columns (4) and (5) control for size-specific cyclical effects. Column (4) interacts the small size dummy with an expansion 
dummy, which takes the value of 0 for 1992-1993 and 1 otherwise, while column  (5) interact s the small size dummy with GDP growth.  
* Denotes significance at the 1% level and ** denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 6:  Effects of the 1990 Reforms on Separations (Full Sample) 
 
      
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
      
A. Men (N = 85,222) 
      
Post-1990 -.0258 (.0150) 
-.0262** 
(.0050) 
-.0284* 
(.0047) 
-.0254** 
(.0062) 
-.0176 
(.0093) 
Small Firms .1161* (.0044) 
.1153* 
(.0044) 
.1155* 
(.0041) 
.1154* 
(.0041) 
.1104* 
(.0095) 
Post-1990  Small Firms  -.0615* (.0015) 
-.0607* 
(.0022) 
-.0609* 
(.0018) 
-.0551* 
(.0018) 
-.0579* 
(.0044) 
      
B. Women (N = 39,548) 
      
Post-1990  .0027 (.0416) 
-.0113 
(.0132) 
-.0063 
(.0010) 
.0074 
(.0104) 
.0140 
(.0102) 
Small Firms .1210* (.0028) 
.1206* 
(.0025) 
.1210* 
(.0027) 
.1211* 
(.0026) 
.1708* 
(.0234) 
Post-1990  Small Firms  -.0637* (.0012) 
-.0623* 
(.0028) 
-.0624* 
(.0030) 
-.0861* 
(.0032) 
-.0899* 
(.0136) 
      
Sector Fixed Effects YES NO NO NO NO 
Sector-specific Trenes NO YES YES YES YES 
Sectoral Productivity NO NO YES YES YES 
Recession Dummy NO NO NO YES NO 
GDP Growth Rate NO NO NO NO YES 
      
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parenthesis allow for clustering by period/size.  All specifications control for region and year 
effects, age, a gender dummy, a white-collar dummy, and total number of employees in the firm.  Some specifications include sector 
fixed effects, while others include sector-specific trends and sectoral productivity, which is calculated as value-added deflated using a 
sector-level PPI over the number of workers using 1995 as the base year.  Columns (4) and (5) control for size-specific cyclical 
effects. Column (4) interacts the small size dummy with an expansion dummy, which takes the value of 0 for 1992-1993 and 1 
otherwise, while columns (5) interact s the small size dummy with GDP growth.  * Denotes significance at the 1% level and ** 
denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 7: Effects of the 1990 Reforms on Separations (Regulation Sample) 
 
      
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
      
A. Men (N = 11,232) 
 
Regulated Sector  -.0132 (.0363) 
-.9932 
(10.02) 
-1.337 
(8.213) 
-.1253 
(8.478) 
1.71 
(10.24) 
Post-1990 -.1059* (.0203) 
-.0855* 
(.0177) 
-.0844* 
(.0149) 
-.0821* 
(.0158) 
-.0805* 
(.0115) 
Small Firms  .0426* (.0088) 
.0420* 
(.0090) 
.0421* 
(.0089) 
.0421* 
(.0089) 
.0388 
(.0446) 
Post-1990  Small Firms .0070 (.0052) 
.0075 
(.0057) 
.0076 
(.0057) 
.0272* 
(.0052) 
.0098 
(.026) 
Post-1990  Regulated Sector .0795* (.0022) 
.0516 
(.0280) 
.0618** 
(.0250) 
.0672** 
(.0271) 
.0765** 
(.0239) 
Small Firms  Regulated Sector .0955* (.0118) 
.0907* 
(.013) 
.0920* 
(.0144) 
.0913* 
(.0142) 
.0898 
(.0467) 
Post-1990  Small Firms   
Regulated Sector 
-.0777* 
(.0037) 
-.0696* 
(.0086) 
-.072* 
(.0101) 
-.0833* 
(.0102) 
-.0699** 
(.0284) 
 
B. Women (N = 5,581) 
      
Regulated Sector  - - - - - 
Post-1990 -.0077 (.0189) 
-.0219 
(.0203) 
-.0218 
(.0205) 
-.0218 
(.0188) 
-.0113 
(.0329) 
Small Firms  .0930* (.0027) 
.0928* 
(.0027) 
.0928* 
(.0027) 
.0929* 
(.0027) 
.0986** 
(.0393) 
Post-1990  Small Firms -.0499* (.0017) 
-.0489* 
(.0008) 
-.0489* 
(.0008) 
-.076* 
(.0009) 
-.0522** 
(.0211) 
Post-1990  Regulated Sector -.0108 (.0013) 
.0065 
(.0285) 
.0073 
(.0262) 
.0329 
(.0234) 
.0171 
(.0463) 
Small Firms  Regulated Sector -.0293* (.0053) 
-.0369* 
(.0038) 
-.0368* 
(.0039) 
-.0366* 
(.0032) 
.0004 
(.0658) 
Post-1990  Small Firms   
Regulated Sector 
.0184* 
(.0018) 
.0299* 
(.0058) 
.0298* 
(.0061) 
.0151** 
(.0054) 
.0098 
(.0357) 
      
Sector Effects YES NO NO NO NO 
Sector-specific Trends NO YES YES YES YES 
Sectoral Productivity NO NO YES YES YES 
Recession Dummy NO NO NO YES NO 
GDP Growth Rate NO NO NO NO YES 
      
 
Notes: The regulation sample includes workers and firms in the retail, road transportation, electricity, telecommunications, air 
transportation and textile sectors.  The retail, road transportation, electricity, and telecommunications are classified as regulated, 
while the air transportation and textile sectors are classified as unregulated.  Robust standard errors in parenthesis allow for clustering 
by period/size.  All specifications control for region and year effects, age, a gender dummy, a white-collar dummy, and total number 
of employees in the firm.  Some specifications include sector fixed effects, while others include sector-specific trends and sectoral 
productivity, which is calculated as value-added deflated using a sector-level PPI over the number of workers using 1995 as the base 
year.  Columns (4) and (5) control for size-specific cyclical effects. Column (4) interacts the small size dummy with an expansion 
dummy, which takes the value of 0 for 1992-1993 and 1 otherwise, while columns (5) interacts the small size dummy with GDP 
growth.  * Denotes significance at the 1% level and ** denotes significance at the 5% level. 
